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happen for the District of Columbia. As I told Mark Plotkin about
three months ago when we announced our Petition for Redress of
Grievances and forthcoming lawsuit, I've come to believe our
constitutional case is irresistible!
Thank you very much.
HOST: Ladies and gentlemen, we are going to get started with our
second panel discussion. We thank those of you who were able to stay
with us through lunch, and we thank our panelists and debaters for also
staying with us and for their willingness to participate in this discussion.
This will be an opportunity for the panelists who served as judges
during the debate to discuss the arguments that were propounded by
our debaters and also to perhaps question some of the debaters on the
arguments that they used.
Later in the panel discussion, the audience members will have an
opportunity to also question either the panelists or the debaters and to
make any comments they might have.
We would like to remind the members of the audience that we do
have microphones, small microphones, in the ceiling that are recording
this symposium for transcription. So if you do need to communicate
with your neighbors, please keep that in mind and keep your voice to a
whisper.
Professor Niles will again be moderating this panel discussion.
VI. RESPONSES TO THE DEBATE ON WHETHER CONGRESS MUST END
THE DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Good afternoon. When we
gathered this morning, we were originally told that during the actual
debate we would have a chance to ask some questions and interrupt the
discussion. There is nothing that attorneys like more than interrupting
people when they are talking. But there is nothing attorneys like less
than being interrupted, so the panelists requested that these questions
be left until the end, which seemed to make a lot of sense.
So just to let you know what we are going to do with the panel, we are
going to have the panel go through three sort of steps, through the
panel first. I am going to give everybody a chance to comment on the
things that were said, some of the things that were said, in the debate,
either specifically or generally in terms of the issues that were raised.
Secondly, I want to give everybody a chance to talk about something
that maybe wasn't specifically touched on in the debate but that arises
out of the same issue, or broader sort of concerns about voting or race
or other issues that they might be interested in.
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Finally, do sort of a "McLaughlin Group" type thing and try to give
people a chance to predict where they think this is all going, both in
terms of where this case is going to end up and also, depending on
where it ends up, if they have any other suggestions about how to deal
with these issues.
So I am going to start off with Professor Anthony Farley.
Professor Farley.
PROFESSOR FARLEY: Good afternoon. First, I want to thank
Professor Raskin for writing such a brilliant and timely article. Second,
I want to thank American University's Washington College of Law and
the Law Reiew for inviting me down here today to talk. I want to begin
my talk by talking about not talking. I want to talk about the fatwa that
was recently lifted from Salman Rushdie, author of The Satanic Verses.'57
I thought that Judge Markman and Professor Kurland this morning
were speaking in the language of what I'll call white fundamentalism.
For fundamentalists, everything is simple. For fundamentalists
everything boils down to one simple thing, one fundamental thing.
This morning Markham and Kurland told us repeatedly, "It is all there
in the text, just look." I once heard a comedian pretend to be a
fundamentalist-type confronting the complexities of American
literature. If my memory serves me, the comedian sounded like much
of what we heard this morning: "Moby Dick is about a white whale. It
says, white whale 10,000 times. Why are you coming up with these
other theories?"
Markman and Kurland stuck with this notion of the "end of the
story." That was a phrase repeated several times this morning.
Originalism, federalism, and textualism were presented as the Trinity-
the all-that-there-can-be in the world of constitutional interpretation.
Ours is a black/white constitution, according to Markman and Kurland.
157. SALMAN RusHwE, THE SATANIC VERsES (1989) (discussing white fundamentalism). I am
using Rushdie and the fatwa issued against him as a way to discuss white fundamentalism. I have no
comment to make regarding either Rushdie's novel or hisfatwa. I use the termfatwa to reverse the
orientalist reflex of so much 'Western" scholarship. Rather than deploying the term fatwa to
conjure the image of an intolerant exotic eastern other, I have here deployed the term to show
Western-white-intolerance on its own face. I hope I have turned the sign-fatwa against its usual
meaning. The text of thefatwa against Rushdie is as follows:
I would like to inform all the intrepid Muslims of the World that the author of the book
The Satanic Vmes, which has been compiled, printed and published in opposition to Islam,
the Prophet and the Qu'r,m, as well as those publishers who were aware of its contents,
have been declared madhur el dam [those whose blood must be shed]. I call on all
zealous Muslims to execute them quickly, wherever they find them, so that no one will
dare insult Islam again. Whoever is killed in this path will lie regarded as a martyr.
(Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini)-14 February 1989: Day 1.
Salman Rushdie Deference Organization (visitedJan. 28,1999) <http://www.gn.apc.org/artidel9/
rusfatwa.html>. The fatwa against Salamn Rushdie has been withdrawn. See Barbara Crossette, Iran
Drops Rushdie Death Threat, And Britain Renews Tehran Tiet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1998, at A1.
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Theirs was an odd fundamentalism, a white fundamentalism, that
reminded me of the The Satanic Verses and of the recently lifted fatwa. I
think that Professor Raskin and Professor Butler were trying to lift the
fatwa, to lift the ban against speaking truth to power in the context of
the right to vote and be represented in the District of Columbia, and to
end the kind of constitutional fundamentalism that has ended freedom
here in the District of Columbia where the right to vote and be
represented has yet to be recognized.
So as "judge" of this morning's "debate," I can only conclude that
Professor Raskin and Professor Butler won. But this is more than an
academic debate. It is about right and wrong or, if you will, good and
evil. I am going to talk about Ronald Wilson Reagan and Philadelphia.
I want to talk about Philadelphia because I think that this relates to
the argument we have heard today. I will not talk about the city of
Brotherly Love, rather, I will talk about the other Philadelphia. I will
talk about Philadelphia, Mississippi. That is where we find the origin of
the white fundamentalist arguments that we heard about the
Constitution this morning fromMarkman and Kurland. Philadelphia,
Mississippi is the place where Ronald Wilson Reagan got his winning
start. It is where he launched his 1980 Presidential campaign. It is a
city known for only one thing: its anti-integrationist posture against civil
rights workers Michael Schwerner, Andrew Goodman and James
Chaney.ss Schwerner, Goodman and Chaney were lynched in the
name of states' rights.159
We need to go back to Philadelphia, Mississippi to understand the
right to vote and be represented. I followed the argument this morning
most closely when Professor Butler said this was an argument about
race. He gave us his "seven minute warning" that race was going to
enter the picture. And then it did.
The battle against segregation or the battle for states' rights-which
side are you on? That is the question today as it was yesterday. Ronald
Wilson Reagan's speech in 1980 in Philadelphia, Mississippi was a
speech given after he refused to accept an invitation to speak at the
annual convention of the NAACP.'60 He began his campaign to capture
the hearts and minds of the electorate by talking about original intent
and states' rights, for example, federalism. 6' By any other name, it
158. See Douglas E. Kneeland, Reagan Campaigns at Miissippi Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1980, at
All.
159. See FLORENCE MARs, WITNESS IN PHILADELPHIA 235 (1997) (discussing the lynching of
Schwerner, Goodman and Chaney which occurred onJune 16,1964, in Philadelphia, Mississippi).
160. See id.
161. It is important to remember that arguments about federalism in the context of black
disenfranchisement have a history:
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smells like a lynching.
It smells like the kind of ultra-violence historically deployed to keep
blacks away from the polls. Violence is a thing that we can lose sight of
when we discuss voting in a doctrinalist way. What are we talking about
when we talk about the right to vote and be represented? We are
talking about representing subaltern bodies by something other than
fire, mutilation, and pain. We must remember that the disenfranchised
black body swaying from Southern (and Northern) trees constituted a
flaming spectacle around which the white body politic gathered to feel
its difference.' 62 If voting makes a difference, non-voting makes
violence.
They felt especially selected to hold the franchise when making it
clear to Others, as they were burning them-the Others and their
fellow travelers, people like Schwerner, Goodman, and Chaney-that
the right to vote and be represented was white.
With Brown v. Board of Education,'6s we reached a national decision.
Perhaps I should not say "we." I am after all sitting here in the District
where "we" cannot vote. We seem to have been made exceptions to the
Supreme Court's statement that segregation causes damage to people's
hearts and minds. The denial of the franchise, based on race, is a form
of segregation. And it is damaging to our hearts and minds.
Remember that Brown dealt with school desegregation. Remember
that what was done to young children and to all of us through
segregation is the kind of damage to our hearts and minds that may
never be undone.
I want to focus our attention on the damage that segregation causes
to hearts and minds-the brain damage and damage to one's moral
character from seeing the lines of exclusion-as we talk about whether
those lines are just imaginary. Is the denial of the right to vote and be
represented a question of the colorline? If so, how do we know?
There is a case, Paliner v. Thompson,'64 that was not talked about this
morning, a 1970s case from Jackson, Mississippi dealing with the
desegregation of public swimming pools. The city fathers-and they
After 1954, white supremacy and the states'-rightist view of federalism were so interwoven
in the ideology of Massive Resistance that it is impossible to say that one was more
important than the other to the South's counterrevolution. Neither was temporally prior
to the other in all respects... and neither was necessary and sufficient cause of the other.
A given individual might hold to one and reject the other. But in practice the myths were
perfectly complementary, since both were created by white people with the interest of the
white race in mind.
FRANCIS M. WIutorr, THE POLmCS OF MASSIVE REsISTANcE 62-63 (1973).
162. S&egenera/!yWALTERWHrrE, ROPEAND FAGGOT (1969).
163. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
164. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
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were all fathers in Jackson-didn't want to integrate the pools. They
claimed they could not integrate safely. They closed the pools. Mayor
Allen Thompson announced that "we are not going to have any
intermingling." 165
William Kuntsler, in a losing argument before our textualized,
original intentioned and states' rights/federalist Supreme Court, said
that we should judge these things from the perspective of the people
the Civil War amendments were designed to protect
An incident of slavery is anything that makes a black man reasonably
feel inferior to a white man. It's the opposite of what Mr. Justice
Brown said in Pessy. He said, if the black race chooses to put that
interpretation upon riding in segregated coached, that's their look-
out, not ours. But I submit that it is your look-out, because this court
is nothing more than an extension of the American personality, an
extension of the American sociology. And that's the heart of this
case. That is why I think the court must take a stand and say, yes, the
closing of the pools violates the Thirteenth Amendment. That we as
a Court have just as much responsibility as Congress, just as much
responsibility as the executive, in wiping out the badges, because
unless they are wiped out, no black person can feel secure in the
United States, and every black person will eventually build up a rage
that is already sufficient enough, that will build up a rage inside that
he knows that in white eyes he is an inferior.6
The Pools remained closed and white fundamentalism won the day.
Every five-year-old black child in the city of Jackson, Mississippi
understood why the pools were closed. The pools were closed to keep
black people out of the pools. Judging from that perspective, the pool
closing could not be allowed to stand without a dangerous build-up of
black rage.67
Well, in Washington, D.C., nobody black, nobody with a black friend,
misunderstands why there are not two senators and a representative.
We do not have representation because this is a black city. Democracy
would necessarily entail the possibility of two black, or black-friendly
165. MAY IT PLEASE THE CourTr: THE Mosr SIGNIFICANT ORAL ARGUMENTS MADE BEFORE THE
SUPREME COURT SINCE 1955, at 292 (Peter Irons & Stephanie Guitton eds., 1993).
166. Idat295.
167. Se FRANTz FANON, THE WRETcHED OF THE EARTH (Constance Farrington trans., 1963).
Fanon wrote of this rage:
The settler keeps alive in the native an anger which he deprives of an outlet; the native is
trapped in the tight links of the chains of colonialism.... While the settler or policeman
has the right the livelong day to strike the native, to insult him and to make him crawl to
them, you will see the native reaching for his knife at the slightest hostile or aggressive
glance cast on him by another native; for the last resort of the native is to defend for his
personality vis-5-vis his brother.
Id at 54.
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senators and one black or black-friendly representative. Every black
person here understands why we do not have the right to vote and be
represented.
I want to share one final idea. Being in D.C., is like being in that
place where Kurt Vonnegut meets Kenneth Clark. I felt a Welcome to
the Doll House moment when I arrived. I looked out over the cityscape
and read the newspapers, turned on the television and witnessed
fratricidal ultra-violence, the collective self-destruction that has reached
epidemic proportions. I witnessed the plague of internalized rage that
is, day after day, cited as the reason why D.C. does not deserve
statehood.
Professor Raskin deals with the desert argument in his article, but we
didn't talk about it very much today. The argument was present,
however, in the interstices of each sentence uttered today. The
argument was present as a kind of background radiation that filled the
entire universe of possible debate. The chaos that we see in
Washington, D.C. is a chaos spawned by the segregationist order of
things. We know, we all know, that the segregationist order creates the
very chaos upon which it relies for its own justification.
The criminal justice system is out of control-the criminal justice
system I used to toil in as an Assistant United States Attorney. The
system has virtually achieved total imprisonment here in the District.
The system has produced the spectacle of slavery almost re-achieved,
and Professor Raskin writes of this in his article.
Apartheid South Africa imprisoned 333 people per 100,000 residents,
compared to Washington, D.C, where we have 1,651 prisoners per
100,000. The fact of blackness-in-chains gives weight to the two-
stranded lesson of segregation and disenfranchisement. Particularly
given that our arrest rate, five times the rate of Apartheid South Africa,
has been brought about by the Reagan-Bush regime and a Republican
legislature in which District of Columbia residents are not represented.
Anti-democracy begets hyper-incarceration and hyper-incarceration
begets recidivism and recidivism begets chaos and chaos begets new
cries of anti-democracy, of textualism, of originalism, of states'
rights/federalism and white fundamentalism.
The originalism, states' rights-ism, and textualism of Ronald Wilson
Reagan in Philadelphia, Mississippi in 1980 has brought forth strange
fruit in the form of near-total incarceration here in the District for black
men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five.
This spectacular chaos is brought about by the very segregationist
order that uses the chaos to justify its existence. Hyper-incarceration is
a form of lynching. Hyper-incarceration is both a new way of keeping
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black bodies away from the polls and the old result of keeping black
bodies away from the polls.
I want to end with a quote about the damage to hearts and minds
done by segregationist orders like the originalism, states rights-ism,
textualism that keeps us from viewing the Constitution as standing for
the principle of one person, one vote here in the District. Frantz
Fanon, the philosopher of anti-colonialism, wrote The Wretched of the
Earth just a few miles from here. He penned the last few pages as he lay
dying in a Bethesda, Maryland federal enclave.
In an earlier work Fanon wrote:
It is not the soil that is occupied. It is not the ports or the
aerodromes. French colonialism has settled in the very center of the
Algerian individual and has undertaken a sustained work of clean-up,
of expulsion of self, of rationally pursued mutilation. There is not an
occupation of territory on the one hand and an independence of
persons on the other. It is the country as a whole, its history, its daily
pulsation that is contested, disfigured in the hope of final destruction.
Under these conditions, the individual's breathing is an observed, an
occupied breathing. It is combat breathing.
' 68
Trapped in this bell jar of anti-democracy that is Washington, D.C., it
is easy to forget that we are occupied. It is easy to fetishize things like
original intent, textualism, and federalism. It is easy to forget that they
are, in the end, the same states' rights that Ronald Wilson Reagan and
the people he started his campaign with in Philadelphia, Mississippi
have brought us all.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Thank you, Professor Farley.
Professor Kairys.
PROFESSOR KAIRYS: I found myself during the debate somewhat
surprised at the weakness of the arguments against the rights set out by
Professor Raskin and Professor Butler. It led me to think, what is going
on here? Who could be against this? What is the problem?
I would like to come back to that. But first, at the risk of being a little
provocative, I'll start with a short summary or highlights of the two
positions presented for the other side.
Judge Markman had what sounded like a rubbing shoulders idea of
democratic participatory rights. That is, since the people of the District
are physically located at the seat of the national government, they have
some kind of unspecified contact with the members of Congress, and
that should be sufficient I was trying to think of how you might use this
opportunity to get your positions or grievances across. I was trying to
168. FIANTZ FANON, ALGERIA UNVEILED IN A DYING COLONIALISM 35, 65 (Haakon Chevalier
trans., 1965).
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take it seriously, although I have to say I found it rather paternalistic.
Proximity does offer some possibilities. You could find out what
iestaurant they hang out in, and you can start eating there, if you can
afford it. Maybe when a napkin falls down you pick it up, they thank
you, and you say, by the way, there is this bill in front of you that affects
the District. Or maybe you frequent the comers you know they pass by
when they go home from work.
I don't know how this would work. Such wonderings aside, there is a
serious problem here. Real citizens vote and get representatives in
Congress.
Professor Kurland, seeming beleaguered, said he was taking some
risk by espousing an important principle which he felt was going to be
unpopular, at least in this audience. But I am not sure what the
principle is; nor was it explained why this principle outweighs the
incredibly important concerns that reside on the other side.
I took Judge Markman and Professor Kurland to raise two kinds of
arguments. One was what I call textual or originalist arguments, which
are matters of constitutional interpretation. The others were matters of
states' rights or federalism. It seemed to boil down these types of
arguments.
On the textual or originalist arguments, the focus was the word
"State." The first and simplest response is that "State" is regularly
interpreted to include the District of Columbia. So no departure from
established interpretations is necessary, and the burden would seem to
be on the opponents to provide a good reason to interpret it differently
for this purpose.
Secondly, from an orginalist perspective, it is important to figure out
what the words used in the Constitution meant to the people who wrote
them. My guess--and I can't claim to do or know more than that on
this issue-is that the Framers would assume that everybody who was a
citizen would have a state. It is the kind of thing about which they
would likely say "we all have one." I don't think they would imagine-
they certainly couldn't imagine the large, urban area that is the District
of Columbia today-that large numbers of people would wind up
stateless as citizens.
These interpretive issues seem to lead in the direction of the
interpretation that Professors Raskin and Butler put forward. So I don't
see much principle there or problem there.
Finally, I think we have to make one further point as a matter of
principle and completeness when it comes to such interpretive issues.
Nobody is really a textualist. Nobody is really an originalist. These are
regularly presented as universal principles of decision making, but
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there has never been ajustice who hasn't found at least an occasion or
two, and usually quite a number more, in which they departed from
them.
I wonder if Judge Markman was an avid opponent of the Vietnam
War because there is a very specific clause in the Constitution that says
we shouldn't have had that war unless it was declared by Congress.
1
So on that basis, I would imagine you would reject any argument that
said, well, things have changed, and we have all of these relationships
and this role in the world, and the President has come to have more
power; or that you would buy what you tend to reject, at least in this
context, arguments like, the appropriations bills should be interpreted
to constitute a declaration of war.
I would think you would be against such arguments and methods and
that you would oppose President Bush's statements and proclamations
before he went into the Persian Gulf War that he didn't need a
declaration of war. It turns out he sought one and got one, but I would
think, as an originalist or textualist, you opposed that position.
I would think you would also oppose the conservative justices these
days who are finding a substantive state sovereignty barrier in the Tenth
Amendment, when the Tenth Amendment, by its explicit words, says it
doesn't have any operation or effect once you are in an area where
Congress has the power to act.
I don't think anyone can claim that such decision making principles
provide the only or even the principal basis on which they make their
constitutional decisions, nor can anyone point to a time or a place
where they were the guiding lights.
As for federalism and states' rights: All progress on equality in the
United States has been made at the expense of states' rights and with
some substantial alteration of federalism. I think it is fair to say that.
There might be some exceptions, but certainly as to most of the major
ones that come to mind, that is so.
I don't mean that states' rights or federalism mean nothing. But
there is a weighing that goes on. Neither has been an absolute
principle, and there is an awful lot to weigh on the other side, which I
didn't hear in either of the two positions that were expressed."'
169. SeeU.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
170. It should be significant in this weighing that, in addition to the countervailing arguments
mentioned earlier, the predominant subject and theme of the amendments to the Constitution
after the Bill of Rights and the Civil War have been inclusion of all our people in the democratic
and electoral process. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (providing the right to vote for African-
Americans); iUL amend. XVII (providing for the direct election of senators); id. amend. XIX
(providing for the right to vote form women); iU amend. XXIV (eliminating the poll tax); id.
amend. XXVI (providing the vote for those 18 and over). See generally DAVID KAIRYS, WrrH LIB.RIY
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So what is going on? Why are they against it? I don't want to speak
about Judge Markman or Professor Kurland; I don't know them any
more than what they have said here. But one can imagine a few things
about the opposition to full citizenship rights for D.C. residents.
This would likely shift the balance of power. There would likely be
two more voices in the Senate on the liberal Democratic side-and
likely a significant increase in the numbers of African American or
minority Senators (since there have been so few to date)-and one
more vote in the House, which is of course less significant. That is
probably not going to make a big difference, but sometimes it is, isn't
it? Sometimes it is going to matter, particularly when control of the
House and the Senate is not all that clear.
Secondly, it would provide a likely platform for additional African-
American leaders. They would have legitimacy. There would be more
black leaders, some of them even in the Senate, about whom you can't
say, who do they speak for, or where do they get off saying anything. So
that is a possible concern.
There could be in some of the opposition a knee-jerk repudiation of
the District of Columbia. Let's be honest. The District of Columbia is a
symbol around the country, particularly on the conservative side, ofjust
about all that is bad in the United States. The opposition could be in
part playing to that, or stemming from that' You could see it as a kind
of symbolic put down.
In the judicial realm, there could be, and opposition may be
expressed as, a repudiation of liberals-depicting the liberals-as was
done, I think, towards Professor Raskin particularly-as not really doing
law right, stretching legal things to suit their own values, as if no one
makes a value based legal argument except liberals.
Finally, there are considerations of race. Challenges made by or on
behalf of African Americans are not doing well in recent decades,1'7 but
stranger things have happened. There are really compelling social and
constitutional arguments.
When I sat in here this morning, I was really, I have to say, shocked at
how convincing the constitutional argument was. I was already
convinced on the social and political side how important it is. But the
constitutional arguments were really quite compelling. What is needed
from the courts is a ringing pronouncement about equality and
ANDJuSTICE FOR SOME 83-84 (1993) (discussing the evolution of American voting rights, and the
courts' eventual recognition that all citizens have the basic right to vote).
171. SeeDavid Kairys, Unexplainable on Grounds Other than RarA 45 AM. U. L. REV. 729 (1996); sme
also Alan Freeman, Antidiscnimjnation Law from 1954 to 1989: Uncertainty, Contradiction,
Rationalization, Denial in THE PoLrrIcS oF LAw 314-24 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998); Charles
Lawrence Ill, Race and Affirmativ, Action, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra, at 294-311.
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democracy. Maybe they will do it, particularly since it presents a
compelling case for such a pronouncement, and there is not a major
downside.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Mr. Valentine.
MR. VALENTINE: As the only Senate staff member here, I want to
make dear that I am not the one who Judge Ferren described during
his luncheon address as having treated the governor of Puerto Rico in a
disrespectful manner. In fact, just last month, the Governor was in to
see Senator Smith. The Senator saw him, and he didn't even wait to
finish listening to some music before he talked to him.
Given that back in 1992, I was the Bush Justice Department's witness
testifying on Capitol Hill against the D.C. statehood bill, it should come
as no surprise that I agree with Professor Kurland and Judge Markman.
My 1992 testimony on behalf of the Bush Justice Department made the
point that pursuant to Article I, Section Eight, Clause Seventeen, of the
Constitution, once Maryland and Virginia ceded the land that became
the District of Columbia, and Congress accepted it, the District became
a fixed constitutional entity that cannot be changed except by
constitutional amendment.
I should add that this was not a legal position that originated during
the Reagan and Bush years. Rather, it is a principle that first was
enunciated by the Kennedy Administration and has been the position
of the Justice Department on this constitutional question since that
time.
It follows from that constitutional principle that Congress cannot
make the District of Columbia a state by means of a simple statute. It
also follows that the 1846 retrocession by Congress of land that Virginia
had ceded was unconstitutional.
I remember that Delegate Norton, who was on the House Committee
on the District of Columbia when I testified against the D.C. statehood
bill in 1992,, was primed to nail me on the question of the 1846
retrocession. She said, in effect, "Mr. Valentine, doesn't it mean, if your
principle is the law, that the Virginia retrocession was
unconstitutional?" I said, 'Well, yes, it was." Delegate Norton said,
"Thank you for your candor."
It also follows from that principle that the District cannot be given
one of the essential constitutional attributes of a state, in this case voting
representation in Congress, except by a constitutional amendment.
Congress acted consistently with this principle when it passed and
submitted to the states what became, in 1961, the Twenty-third
Amendment. That amendment gave the District another essential
constitutional attribute of a state, voting representation in the electoral
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college.
As Attorney General Robert Kennedy stated at the time, "The
argument that a federal district with significant territory and population
constituting the seat of government is a permanent part of our
constitutional system is substantially strengthened by the Twenty-third
Amendment."'2
The argument that the citizens of the District have a right to
representation in Congress has great moral force. I thought that that
argument was presented with particular eloquence by Professor Butler
this morning. But the fact that it has great moral force does not mean
that the Constitution requires such a result. It does not.
As has been noted, a lawsuit, Alexander v. Daley, was filed recently in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.In I can only assume
that the Clinton Justice Department will aggressively defend against it.
That lawsuit basically invites the courts-and, ultimately, the Supreme
Court-to amend the Constitution. If the Court accepts that invitation,
it wouldn't be the first time that the Supreme Court has amended the
Constitution by judicial fiat. But another such wrong wouldn't make it
right. I suspect that ultimately the Court will reject the invitation.
Finally, speaking only for myself and not for the Senator for whom I
work, I certainly believe that the citizens of the District of Columbia
should have voting representation in both houses of Congress. But that
goal must be accomplished by constitutional amendment, and not by
other means.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Professor Raven-Hansen.
PROFESSOR RAVEN-HANSEN: I would like to make four remarks,
the first two of which are addressed to Judge Markman. But I want to
say before I do that thatJudge Markman is one of the more principled
and civil opponents we have on this issue, and it would be a mistake to
reject him as a reflexive conservative on the subject of D.C. voting
rights. I say this not just because he is a judge, because since I have
tenure I can thumb my nose at judges. I say it because he is a
thoughtful person on the issue, and we need to take his arguments
seriously because they will be very influential in the Congress at which
this lawsuit is ultimately aimed.
He argues that the word "State" in Article I, Section Two, is the
172. Letter and Memorandum from Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General, to Hon. Basil L.
Whitener, House Committee on the District of Columbia (Dec. 13, 1963), repinted in Home Rule,
Hearing on HI.R 141 Before Subcommittee No. 6 of the House Committee on the District of Columbia, 88th
Cong., 341,348 (1984).
173. 26 F. Supp. 2d 156 (1998).
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beginning and end of the legal debate here, and since the District is not
a state in Article I, Section Two, we need to go no further.
I was studying the Dred Scott opinion at lunch for reasons that will
become clear in a minute. There was a footnote in the casebook I was
reading that I quote or paraphrase, and I trust that it is true.
Remember, the issue in Dred Scott was whether a black man was a
"citizen" for purposes of going to court, and the Court concluded he
wasn't."" The footnote pointed out that corporations are not "citizens"
for purposes of privileges and immunities under Article IV in the
Constitution."" They are "citizens" for purposes of diversity jurisdiction
in going to court. They are not "persons" for Fourteenth Amendment
due process and equal protection purposes. But they are "persons" for
due process under the Fifth Amendment. Corporations are "people"
for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Well, obviously, the same words mean different things in the
Constitution. This is not a bit of unprincipled jurisprudence by crazy
idealogues on the Court. It is an effort slowly to figure out what the
word means in context Let me go back to Article I, Section Two, that
Judge Markman pointed us to.
The language that he says is definitive is that "the House of
Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second
year by the People of the several States."'76 There is that word "State."
But, if you haven't stopped there, you would see that twelve lines later
in Article I, Section Two, it says that "direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included within the Union,
according to their respective Numbers."'
Well, no less a judge than Chief Justice Marshall ruled that this
permitted direct taxation according to population in the District of
Columbia.'78 The District was effectively a state for purposes of Article I,
Section Two, the very same section, same word, twelve lines later.
Subsequently, regarding Article I, Section Eight, the Court ruled that
a provision that enables Congress to legislate and regulate commerce
among the states includes regulation of commerce between states and
the District of Columbia.' 9 The District suddenly was a state again,
again for Article I purposes.
Later the Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment applied to citizens
174. SeeScottv. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
175. See PAUL BREsr & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING:
CASESAND MATERIALS 203 n.35 (3d ed. 1992).
176. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1.
177. Id c. 3 (repealed 1868).
178. SeeLoughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317 (1820).
179. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
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in the District of Columbia.' The Sixth Amendment is even more
particular with respect to its use of "State." It says that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy... trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . ."181
It does not mean the District of Columbia here; it means a judicial
district.
So the Framers obviously had in mind the geographic units that we
know of as states. Yet, the District of Columbia was included within the
meaning of the Sixth Amendment, according to the Supreme Court's
interpretation.
So what do we learn from that? Well, I think we learn, and I quote
now from Justice Brennan, that "[w]hether the District of Columbia
constitutes a 'State or Territory' within the meaning of any particular
statutory or constitutional provision depends upon the character and
aim of the specific provision involved."'
Now that is not to say that we are home free in arguing that Article I,
Section Two, the portion dealing with representation, includes the
District. But it certainly frees us to make that argument in a non-
frivolous way and to take it seriously.
The great constitutional purpose we accomplish by interpreting
"State" to include the District is representation. This is no small thing.
Is that somehow a lesser constitutional purpose than direct taxation or
regulation of interstate commerce, for which purposes the Court
interpreted state to include the District of Columbia? So that is my first
point.
Point two is a shorter one, you will be happy to hear. On the first
Monday of December 1800, the people who lived in Maryland and who
were citizens of Maryland and citizens of the United States and had
voted for ten years in Maryland elections to Congress, lost their vote. I
would like to know from Professor Kurland or Judge Markman or
anyone in the room, how did that happen? How did they lose their
vote? What happened to suddenly extinguish their right to vote in
Congress? Did they waive it, somehow sign a paper saying they had
given it up? Because an answer to that question is necessary to
determine whether this suit has substance.
I contend they couldn't have lost their vote. Their descendants still
live here. Where is that vote? If you can find that vote, you may have an
answer to whether this lawsuit has substance.
My third point is directed atJamie, because I don't want our other
180. SeeCallan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
181. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
182. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418,420 (1973).
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panelists to feel that they are isolated here. Jamie stops short of the
hardest question that this lawsuit presents, which is the remedy.
There is a constitutional right to vote. We don't know whether it is
substantive or procedural or relative or whatever. But it floats out there,
and we like it. The courts should just declare that is the constitutional
right, and then Congress will certainly implement the appropriate
remedy.
Well, what is it? Let me give you a range of the alternatives and raise
some questions about each of them. First, the NIH solution-that is the
solution that would give the District residents voting rights as part of the
Maryland-is to vote for the congressional representatives from
Maryland. There is some basis for saying that this could be a
constitutional solution because that is what we do with people at NIH.
They have the right to vote in Maryland elections on the theory that
they have an interest in the outcome. Their interest is sufficient to give
Congress the right to force them on Maryland. I think you could make
the argument that the District of Columbia residents have at least the
same interest in Maryland and could be forced on Maryland.
Another alternative is the Overseas Voting Rights alternative. You
may know that people who have left the United States twenty years ago
and live in Paris and speak nothing but French still have the right to
vote in federal elections through the state in which they were once
domiciled. How come they get the right to vote when D.C. residents
don't, and doesn't that suggest another solution, which is to give D.C.
residents the right to vote in the states from which they originally came?
Now there are problems with both of these solutions. The last
solution leaves a bunch of people who were born here without a vote.
Both solutions give you individual rights, but not the collective rights we
spoke of this morning. I think that is a real serious problem with them.
A third alternative and remedy is a statute giving D.C. residents the
voting rights in Congress, not as part of the Maryland delegation, but
directly. For that we have to treat the District as a state. There is an
issue about whether it ought to be voting rights only in the House
versus the Senate because the language of the Constitution is somewhat
different in these regards. That is not an easy issue, and it is one we
haven't addressed.
But I should also add here that we might take some comfort from
one of the Framers who, as Jeffrey Rosen indicated this morning,
committed adultery while in office. His sin was revealed by a leak from
his political opposition, and he was then accused of corruption by
trying to pay off his paramour's husband. He decided to come clean
and confess to the adultery and apologize to his family.
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Alexander Hamilton's reputation is no worse for it. And he said in
the ratification debates in New York about the Constitution when he
was addressing the D.C. Clause, the people of the District would
continue to vote in Maryland and Virginia until their number reached a
level in which "provision shall be made by Congress for their having a
District Representation in the Body.'
83
He didn't mention a constitutional amendment, and it would have
been odd for him to be describing a constitutional amendment when
he says "provision... by Congress." So there is a guy who has the view
that this could have been cured by Congres§.
So there is some historical support for this argument. But it is by no
means a done deal that a court would order it if Congress didn't pursue
it, or that Congress would see its way fit to granting this solution.
Retrocession and statehood are other solutions. I have to say I have a
strong feeling about statehood because I think voting representation in
Congress only gives you half the loaf. You still need, I think, local
government that is completely independent, and you don't get that
with just voting representation in Congress. But we can discuss
retrocession and statehood another day.
Finally, a voting rights amendment offers another remedy. It should
have passed last time. If you look back at the arguments against it, they
are pathetic. The principal argument advanced, as I recall, was that the
constitutional amendment to give D.C. voting rights in Congress was
unconstitutional. Constitutional lawyers shake their head at that one.
An amendment was the elegant solution, and it was opposed because
forty-nine states of fifty states in the country didn't understand the
problem.
Which brings me to my last point Professor Kurland, I thought,
rather unfairly cited conversations this morning over coffee when he
said that I said that this was a losing lawsuit. Well, he did ask me did I
think this lawsuit would succeed, and my answer was I don't think it will.
But if Dred Scott had come to me and said, do you think I am going to
win this lawsuit, I would have said, "Dred, I don't think you are going to
win this lawsuit. But God damn it, bring it." He might have won. He
got a dissenting vote from Justice Curtis."" If he had won, we might
have been spared the Civil War.
I would have given the same advice to the plaintiff in Pessy v.
Ferguson.'s5 But he brought the suit and he lost. Over a period of time,
183. 5 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 189 (Harold C. Sybett & Jacob E. Cooke eds.,
Columbia Univ. Press 1962).
184. Scotty. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 564 (1856) (Curtis,J., dissenting).
185. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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there were some wins and some losses culminating in Brown v. the Board
of Education.18 6
The measure of whether you bring a lawsuit is not whether you are
going to win in the sense of getting ajudicial remedy. There is more to
it than that. What I think Professor Kurland ignores-and I won't
make this accusation against Judge Markman-is the moral and
educative dimension in litigation. Once you pass the threshold of
having a non-frivolous claim, in our country we use lawsuits partly to
make moral points and to educate. We're trying to educate notjust the
judge, but people beyond thx courtroom, and in this case the Congress.
There is every reason to attempt this moral and educative effort, so
long as it is not a frivolous lawsuit. I think what I have said and what
Jamie has said shows that it is not.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): There are some relatively
specific points that Professor Raven-Hansen had to make, and I want to
give you all just a few minutes to respond to them before Todd gives his
little speech. If you could remind-
PROFESSOR RAVEN-HANSEN: Well, two specific questions, I guess.
The first is, given Judge Markman's emphasis on Article I, Section Two,
and the meaning of "State" there, what do you do with the three or four
Supreme Court decisions, including the one interpreting the word state
in that same provision, which have interpreted "State" to include the
District.
The other question was what happened to the right to vote that the
Maryland residents enjoyed for the first ten years?
JUDGE MARKMAN: Both Professor Raven-Hansen and Professor
Raskin have identified several decisions of the Supreme Court in their
respective articles that I agree give rise to a reasonable argument that
"State" means different things in different contexts of statutory, and
perhaps even constitutional interpretation. Ultimately, however, I
reject the application of those cases to the present controversy.
First, I think that if you look at them they are exceedingly narrowly-
focused decisions. Second, each of these decisions operated to sustain
Congress' authority to legislate for the District under Article I, not to
compel the Congress to do anything, as Professor Raskin's suit would
do. Third, they focused on areas of public policy in which there is
arguably little if any practical reason to distinguish between the states
and the District of Columbia.
These distinctions are especially compelling when you consider the
Court's refusal to interpret the word "State" to include the District of
186. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Columbia, even with respect to the principal statute used to enforce the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, that is section 1983, much
less with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment itself."7
I cannot imagine that the cases cited by Professor Raven-Hansen and
Professor Raskin will persuade the Supreme Court that the Connecticut
Compromise should be reversed-that the Connecticut Compromise,
which has been at the heart of our Constitution and which has defined
federalism for more than two centuries, ought to be effectively nullified.
That the United States now ought to mean what one senator referred to
in the District of Columbia voting rights amendment debate as the
"United States and Other Assorted Things of America." That is
ultimately what Professor Raskin's suit would result in.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Thank you.
PROFESSOR KURLAND: I have a brief comment. Professor Raven-
Hansen, I did not mean to improperly comment on a coffee discussion.
But I do want to make a point. I don't have any quarrel at all with the
concept. I am a little bit upset about the fact that my comments have
been apparently interpreted as ignoring the moral dimension of the
issue.
I have said in other writings, and I will say again today, that one's
personal view of the morality of a particular issue does not necessarily
make it constitutional. A similar issue arose with the Equal Rights
Amendments 8 People can debate the morality of an issue.
Now with regard to the moral points, the voting rights is-I agree
that that is a very, very high priority, and the District citizens should
have it. I think it needs to be done by constitutional amendment,
which, I think, is a very mainstream position to take.
With regard to the education value of a lawsuit, I have no problem
with the concept that at certain times you file lawsuits serving an
educative function, even if the chances of success in a particular lawsuit
are very slim. I don't think that I was misinterpreting your earlier
comments--that the chances of winning this lawsuit, I think, are very
slim.
On the other hand, this particular issue already has been debated in
Congress. I think it was you, or somebody else said, that this lawsuit
ultimately is aimed at Congress. This particular issue is out there. It has
been debated in Congress. This lawsuit is not needed to further raise
the conscience level of the ultimate people who are going to have to
187. See42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
188. See Kurland, supra note 117, at 504 ("When moral claims [such as the proposed Equal
Rights Amendment] seek vindication through the legislative process, they must adhere to
constitutional requirements.").
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make the decision, Congress. That has already been done.
So other issues, I think, might have a legitimate purpose in filing a
lawsuit for educative value. I think the education value on this issue is
already out there. Congress was not persuaded. Again, with regard to
Dred Scott, this entire issue, whenever you take the position that
statehood has some constitutional obstacles to overcome, is often-you
know, Dred Scott and some other issues are often thrown out.
As important as the issue of D.C. voting lights is, I don't think it is
going to lead to Civil War if the court decides the case against the
plaintiffs.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Thank you. Mr. Cox, please.
MR. COX: Thank you very much. As background, I bring voting
fights cases as part of my work at the Legal Defense Fund, bringing
lawsuits under the Voting Rights Act and the National Voter
Registration Act, primarily on behalf of African-American and other
minorities. Therefore, the primary thrust of my work is representing
the traditionally underrepresented and doing whatever I can to make
sure their voting rights are secure.
Having said that, this debate over the D.C. voting rights case strikes
me as parallel to traditional voting rights lawsuits and the efforts that we
take to make sure that the underrepresented receive their voting rights
and ensure they have an equal opportunity to elect their candidates of
choice. So I would like to make some comments that put this debate
into a larger voting rights context, drawing some parallels between what
I think this litigation can accomplish in that context, and drawing some
lessons from traditional voting rights litigation.
First, I think the struggle for voting rights in this country, particularly
for minorities and for traditionally underrepresented citizens, has
usually progressed through litigation. I think this is because, and this is
no surprise, the political process tends to be a majoritarian one. If you
are underrepresented or you are a minority, you are not in the majority,
obviously. Therefore, seeking to vindicate your fights through the
political process may be ultimately unavailing because that process is
one in which the majority rules. We have historically relied on the
courts to play a counter-majoritarian role to help secure the rights
denied through the political process and make the exercise of those
rights meaningful and effective.
I think in the District of Columbia this has played out, as we have
discussed, by the majority in Congress voting against the opportunity to
enfranchise District residents or to give the District certain electoral
rights through amending the Constitution.
Also, it has played itself out by a Congressional majority expressing its
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will to deny the District of Columbia what its government believes it
needs in order to operate and manage fiscally and in other areas.
So the D.C. enfranchisement lawsuit may serve the traditional and
historical role of giving teeth to the Constitution's promise of equal
rights and equal electoral opportunity, securing our voting rights here
in the District.
At this point, however, I would like to ratify comments that Professor
Butler made regarding the role of race in this debate. I don't think we
need to apologize that race perhaps plays a part in this. While it may
not be the overwhelming part, and it may not totally define the
question, it is unrealistic and a little dangerous to ignore the fact that
race is part of the debate over this lawsuit. It may be part of the
decision that is made by a court. It also may be part of what people take
from this lawsuit, helping define for the community how inclusive a
democracy should be.
Second, since the struggle for voting rights often has been fought
through litigation, as we have discussed, the tenor of the courts will play
critical role in this lawsuit. As I mentioned, we have relied on courts to
be counter-majoritarian and to secure rights we were unable to have
recognized through the political process.
However, courts are increasingly unreliable in this traditional role.
This is shown by the defeat of lawsuits that have contained obvious vote
dilution claims and severe examples of racially polarized voting. This is
demonstrated by the various attacks against majority-minority districts."9
It seems that courts do not favor claims that would empower people
politically, particularly minorities. Therefore, I think this lawsuit will
have some difficulty. It won't be insurmountable, but it will have some
difficulty because it would seem the courts are reluctant to champion
the rights and the interests of the traditionally underrepresented.
Having said that, this litigation is still very important and can be
successful. Given the political realities, given the fact that the political
process is majoritarian and that we have not been as successful in fully
achieving our voting rights in that context, this case may provide the
best opportunity to achieve equal representation.
Finally, I would like to draw some lessons from voting rights cases in
general to examine exactly what this litigation can bring. First,
referencing some of the prior discussions, litigation of this type can
empower voters and increase voter participation.
After the last primary election, many were concerned that voter
189. SeP eg., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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turnout was so low. Well, I have no doubt that the low turnout was
caused in part by voters' feelings that their votes were meaningless.
Voters felt that the District government didn't have a great deal of
autonomy and that their federal representatives on the ballots do not
have an effective or equal voice in Congress. Lawsuits like this, that
promise to provide equal representation, empower people and inspire
voter participation because voters feel that their votes will be effective
and that their votes actually will have meaning at the polls. Providing
this hope is a very important role for this lawsuit, and should not be
dismissed. It is in fact a role that traditional voting rights lawsuits play.
Secondly, a successful lawsuit of this type will have the positive result
of diversifying Congress, both in terms of the representatives and their
perspectives by permitting the election of candidates who have an equal
vote in Congress and who are the choice of District of Columbia voters.
In traditional voting rights lawsuits, some dismiss this benefit, saying
that the candidate of choice will be outvoted and, thus, their
perspective will not matter that much.
But it does matter. Electing officials from the District of Columbia to
Congress with voting power on par with other representatives will help
show to Congress, as well as the rest of the country, that our interests
are really no different than anyone else's. It will help in some way to
mainstream our concerns. Over time, people will understand and
begin to respect our concerns and problems as consistent with those of
other cities and states. The District would no longer by seen as a
foreign or a distant jurisdiction. That is a role that traditional voting
rights lawsuits play, and I think that is a role for this litigation as well.
Finally, in addition to this litigation, I think it is important for our
political leaders to look to other avenues to highlight the inequities we
face in the District. It is noteworthy, for example, that Congresswoman
Norton has made several proposals, one of which involves federal
taxation, to highlight the unequal treatment of the District of Columbia
residents and government.
I think those types of efforts help educate people about exactly what
it is like to live in the District of Columbia and how truly different life is
for the citizens. So I would urge that leaders look to those methods, as
well as litigation, to help effectuate our equal opportunities.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Professor Neuman.
PROFESSOR NEUMAN: I would like to begin by mentioning that I
am speaking last largely because I have arrived late. I was not able to be
here this morning, so I did not hear the debate.
I have heard the debate as filtered through the comments of the
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other panelists, and I am familiar with the debate as reflected in the
writings of the participants. But I was not here for the debate itself, and
it may be that my comments will have some defects as a result.
I am extremely sympathetic with the goals of those who argue that
the disenfranchisement of the District of Columbia is unconstitutional.
It is anomalous. It is unjust. It is disgraceful. But I do not think it is
unconstitutional.
I would also like to say explicitly that I believe think that there are
different degrees of injustice, and that I do not think that the level of
injustice here rises quite to the level of the injustice of the Dred Scott
decision, which was an even greater national disgrace.
The division of the mainland United States into states on the one
hand and the District of Columbia on the other is peculiar in global
comparison, and anachronistic in terms of our own history. Other
democracies, other federal systems, do not find it necessary to
disenfranchise their capital cities, nor is there any practical argument of
necessity for doing so today.
The Seat of Government Clause was written for a federal government
that was new and weak: politically weak, logistically weak, and weak in
terms of its legal powers. All of that has changed. The arrangement
adopted then is no longer necessary for the most powerful government
on earth.
In fact, the District of Columbia is no longer large enough to be the
seat of government in the United States. The real capital of the United
States sprawls beyond the boundaries of the District into Maryland and
Virginia. The federal power to govern enclaves is adequate protection
for some of the most sensitive government functions-the Pentagon,
the CIA, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
However, the Seat of Government Clause is part of the Constitution,
and it has received a consistent interpretation throughout our history as
not entitling the District of Columbia to representation in Congress.
Not solely on textualist grounds, not solely on originalist grounds, but
also reflecting that long, consistent tradition, I believe that, so long as
Congress maintains the District as the seat of government, no
constitutional argument successfully undermines the legal legitimacy of
affording the states and not the District representation in Congress-
even though I do not believe that it is morally legitimate.
Now I have said "so long as Congress maintains the District as the seat
of government" One of the panelists has suggested-and it may have
been also said earlier today; I don't know-that Congress must maintain
the District of Columbia as the seat of government, and that the
retrocession to Virginia was unconstitutional. It is difficult to sustain
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the argument that the retrocession to Virginia was unconstitutional, in
view of our history and in view of what I believe are the proper criteria
for constitutional interpretation.
I believe that it is more reasonable to view the Seat of Government
Clause as a grant of power to Congress, not as an obligation on
Congress.'9 Particularly in light of current circumstances,
circumstances which have existed for perhaps at least a century, maybe
longer, it is reasonable to view Congress as having the option of
maintaining a seat of government ruled under the Seat of Government
Clause, or using its power to govern enclaves as the basis for ruling
something like the proposed national capital service area while giving
back the rest of the District of Columbia.
So I see at least three solutions to what I regard as a very serious
moral dilemma, although none of them is particularly easy politically.
One possibility is amending the Constitution so that the District can still
be the seat of government in the constitutional sense and yet be
represented in the Congress. The second is admitting the District as a
state while reserving some kind of enclave like the national capital
service area. The third is returning the District-presumably to
Maryland-and maintaining the capital service area as an enclave. I see
no constitutional objection to adjoining the District to Virginia instead.
It would seem impractical to adjoin it to California.
One of those solutions would require a constitutional amendment.
The other two, I believe, could be accomplished by statute, if the
political will could be mobilized.
I am not yet persuaded by the argument, which is an interesting
argument and is being made by some of the participants today, that
Congress could keep the District in place and impose all its residents on
one or more states as additional voters. I am not yet persuaded that
that is sufficiently like enfranchising overseas residents in states of
former domicile. Maintaining a fiction of organic continuity between
Maryland and the current District residents seems to me to be contrary
to the individualism of our constitutional tradition, and contrary to the
individual rights perspective on which this whole critique of
disenfranchisement is based. But I don't have as strong and settled a
view on that subject without further debate.
So those are my reasons for believing that the disenfranchisement is a
great injustice which should be cured, for believing that there are both
constitutional amendment and statutory means for curing it, but for not
190. &e Gerald L Neuman, Anomalous Zmes, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1223 (1996) (explaining
the Seat of Government Clause as a grant of power).
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believing that constitutional litigation is likely to provide the solution.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): As I said, I originally thought
of having two more categories of things to discuss. But I want to give
people who have been here all day a chance to say some things to the
panel. I'm sure there are a lot of very interesting questions.
So I am going to try to combine my second two categories into one
and ask any of the panelists who would like to talk about this issue
perhaps in a broader context, includingJamie.
If you'd like to address both the question of whether this voting issue,
voting representation in Congress, is a particularly important factor, to
address the statement made by Professor Neuman that perhaps this
injustice is not as serious an injustice as others might be, or what as
Professor Farley suggested, that perhaps it is a serious injustice that
deserves a lot of attention.
Also perhaps some sort of notion of whether it makes sense, as
Professor Raven-Hansen suggested, to have half a loaf here, or whether
what we really need is both this representation in Congress and local
representation, and discuss the issues of whether we should have or
discuss one without the other.
Finally, a very interesting point that Professor Peller made earlier, for
those who were here, the notion that is voting really that important
anyway, and that in a country with huge amounts of injustice, can
people really express themselves in an important way through the vote
if they don't have other things that enfranchise them in a more
important and broad way.
So I would like to open it up to the panel, and also to the debaters, a
chance to talk about these issues a little more broadly before we go to
questions from the audience. Anybody can go.
PROFESSOR RASKIN: I am cheered by the direction of the
discussion this afternoon. We have a consensus among people on both
sides that there is a major wrong being done here. Some of us believe
that the wrong is actually contrary to constitutional principle, and
others-and I would count, I think, Mr. Valentine and Professor
Neuman now andJudge Markman-as saying even though it is a wrong,
it can only be remedied by a constitutional amendment.
I took your argument to mean, Mr. Valentine, that, yes, it is contrary
to our political philosophy. It is contrary even to our constitutional
values. But it is not unconstitutional. I think you said you would favor a
constitutional amendment to deal with it.
What I would propose to do is just give a couple of counter-examples
from places where there have been proposed constitutional
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amendments, like the failed D.C. Voting Rights Amendment, that were
rejected, but then the Court comes, through the independent evolution
of equal protection jurisprudence, to adopt the very viewpoint of the
rejected constitutional amendment.
Let's start with the Equal Rights Amendment. Now as everyone
knows, there was a long term struggle that narrowly failed to amend the
Constitution to say that equality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged on account of sex. It lost, and it was rejected.
But what we have seen since this struggle is the Supreme Court's
equal protection jurisprudence evolving to adopt something very close
to what the proponents of the ERA were saying, even though the word
"male" still appears in the Constitution in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Let me give you another example. In 1964 the Constitution was
amended by the Twenty-fourth Amendment to ban poll taxes in federal
elections. There is very explicit debate on the floor of the Senate as to
whether this amendment should apply to poll taxes in just federal
elections or state elections as well. Those who championed states'
rights at that point won. They said poll taxes have a long, honorable
tradition in state elections and should not be banned.
So there was the explicit statement that state poll taxes would not be
prohibited as part of the Twenty-fourth Amendment. Butjust two years
later, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,19' the Supreme Court found
that under the Equal Protection Clause, state poll taxes are
unconstitutional.
So the addition of the Twenty-fourth Amendment, far from precluding
the equal protection argument that state poll taxes were unlawful,
actually changed the nature of the Constitution. Each Amendment
changes the overall meaning of the Constitution. That is the way that I
think we should be reading the Twenty-third Amendment, which writes
District residents into the constitutional community for the purposes of
participating in presidential elections. That is a powerful and concrete
statement. The constitutional momentum for democracy in the District
has been unleashed.
Let me just make one other point about federalism. What is so
interesting to me are the differences in constitutional culture that have
surfaced. My friend Judge Markman makes the argument that,
fundamentally, when we get right down to it, this case is about
federalism. By that he means our Union is a union of states. The
District, no matter how you cut it, is a district is a district is a district and
cannot be treated like a state, despite all of the constitutional decisions
191. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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cited by Professor Raven-Hansen. For this principle-and I know that it
is sincerely held by Judge Markman-he cites federalism.
Now to me, federalism plays the exact opposite function in this
argument. The meaning of federalism is not that we have these
mythical juridical and political entities called states that bind us in every
way, but rather the value of federalism is that real communities get to
control their own affairs and destiny.
Communities get to control their own government. Federalism poses
a principle of democratic self-control and self-government. What can
be more antithetical to the principle of federalism than the idea that
the representatives of Alaska and Florida and Rhode Island govern the
community of the District of Columbia without the District of
Columbia's own participation?
So I would like to steal back the mantle of federalism for our side of
the debate.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Professor Kurland and then
someone from the panel can address this in the time we have left.
PROFESSOR KUR.LND: I thinkJamie was very eloquent in what he
just stated. I agree with about ninety-nine percent of that.
I don't know if it was an oversight that you left me out of the people
that aren't-that don't think that there is a serious moral issue, and I
have never said anything to say I don't favor voting rights. I think we
differ as to how it can be accomplished. I feel that it needs a
constitutional amendment.
Now you pointed out some interesting things about the evolving
nature of constitutional doctrine as being influenced by rejected
constitutional amendments. I think that is right because the
Constitution is a living document and interpretations evolve over time.
The ERA situation was opposed by some people precisely because it
was unnecessary because equal protection already protected, and the
Court eventually has come around to that way of thinking.
Some of the other arguments with regard to the poll tax I think more
concisely prove the point that a rejected provision which clearly was not
the law at one particular time does become the constitutional doctrine
over time. Certainly I do not foreclose the possibility that that can
happen with respect to the interpretation of "State," although I find it
very unlikely. I think because, with regard to the make-up of the federal
legislature and the role of the states in their participation in Congress
and in the Senate, I think it is sufficiently concrete and distinct, along
with the constitutional status of the District and the District Clause.
But I think it is unlikely that there would be an evolution with regard
to that matter. If it takes a constitutional amendment, fine. The
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Constitution is difficult to amend.
I can understand the frustration of a failed constitutional
amendment on a particular issue where people feel that it is immoral
but constitutional. I agree with Professor Neuman in that regard, that it
might well be ,an extraordinarily difficult and unacceptable situation
that happens not to be unconstitutional. I can understand the utter
frustrations to say how can something be immoral yet be constitutional.
I think this might be one of those things that just happens to be that
way.
Now with regard to some of the earlier comments, and again, I don't
want to overstate this. But I find it regrettable. I think that is the
proper word-that again, whether it is Philadelphia, Mississippi,
whether it is states' rights, whatever, to imply-that my appearing on
the panel and making an argument that is well within the bounds of
constitutional discourse.
That is the other side of the debate-to threaten the coded racist
words Ijust think is just really lamentable under the circumstances.
I don't know you. To the extent that my politics matter, to the other
panelist, I am a registered Democrat. Again, I am disturbed a little bit
by what I interpret as an accusation of racism with regard to appearing
on this panel to take the other side in a legitimate constitutional
debate. I don't really think that has a place in this debate.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): I think Professor Butler wants
to respond, specifically.
PROFESSOR KURLAND: Also, the other thing is the District voting
limitations, just for the record, as I pointed out before, the District
voting population in 1800, when those few residents were
disenfranchised, was entirely white.
It is not until 1960, as pointed out, that the District had a majority of
black residents. Ironically, it was in 1960 that the Twenty-third
Amendment passed giving the District voting rights in the electoral
college.
So this proposition that majoritarian principles will forever squash
the District because of its majority black population is simply belied by
the facts.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): We're going to go to
Professor Butler and then Professor Farley, and then Judge Markman,
who have all expressed a wish to say something.
PROFESSOR BUTLER- Very quickly. I maybe haven't been listening
to the same presentations that Professor Kurland has heard. But I
haven't heard anyone call him a racist or imply that he is a racist.
What I have heard is a suggestion that it would be willful blindness
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not to recognize that some measure of the opposition to voting rights in
D.C. is based on race. It would be blind to ignore that.
PROFESSOR KURLAND: As someone who has taught at Howard
University for nine years, I am acutely sensitive to all of the concerns
that you are raising. I interpret comments, the earlier comments, that
my presentation and Mr. Markman's presentation was a kind of a states'
rights, white fundamentalism-I interpret those comments quite
differently than your general comments, which I agree with and
endorse.
Again, I don't know the mind-set of the panelists over there. I'mjust
saying that when I hear those kinds of pointed criticisms, that this is
states' rights, those are code words. I have been around long enough to
understand that.
This concept of white fundamentalism-simply arguing about the
term, "State," that is written seven times in the Constitution means state
as opposed to district-and to extrapolate from that, states' rights,
Philadelphia, Mississippi-I don't think that I am overly sensitive when I
say that this implication is unjustified.
PROFESSOR BUTLER: Professor, is the concern-very quickly. My
concern about playing the racist card is that it is a way of silencing
debate about race and acknowledging that race matters.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Professor Farley, I think-
PROFESSOR FARLEY: Sure. I am happy to respond. I don't know
you, Professor Kurland. But Paul and Jamie know me and know that I
am not silenced very often. For the moment, however, please allow me
to substitute another person's voice for my own. Pretend that I am not
Anthony Paul Farley in front of you.
Pretend instead I am Michel Foucault brought back to life, bald
head, same tiny glasses. I imagine that Foucault would have said the
same thing that I said earlier. 93 What I did in my earlier comment was a
192. I forgot to mention Foucault's white skin.
193. Foucault's work celebrates the "insurrection of subjugated knowledges." See Michel
Foucault, Two Lectures in PoWER/KNOwLEGIE: SELEcTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRrrNGS 1972-
1977, at 81 (Colin Gordon ed. & Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980). And this is what I did at
American University. Foucault writes:
By subjugated knowledges I mean two things: on the one hand, I am referring to the
historical contents that have been buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence or
formal systemisation. Subjugated knowedges are thus those blocs of historical knowledge
which were present but disguised within the body of functionalist and systematising theory
and criticism-which obviously draws upon scholarship-has been able to reveal. On the
otherhand, I believe that by subjugated knowledges one should understand something
else ... namely, a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to
their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the
heirarchy, beneath the required level of cognition orscientificity.
Id. at 82.
My comments were meant to excavate these knowledges in two ways. First, I wanted to show how
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Foucaultean genealogy of a certain style of constitutional discourse.
Instead of asking "Is this True or is this not True?" and doing
constitutional metaphysics, instead of doing what Jerome Frank
condemned in Law and the Modem Mind, (the best book on law that you
will ever read), I asked a different set of questions.
certain "conventional" systems of thought-originalism, textualism, and states' rights/federalism-
hide the histories of struggle that preceded their emergence. In this case, the historical connection
between lynching and voting. Second, I want to show how certain local knowledges--the collective
understandings of the colorline that was shared by all black District of Columbia residents in the
audience-which are to be "low down on the hierarchy" exist and are needed. See id. Foucault
writes: "Well it seems to me that our critical discourses of the last fifteen years [1961-1976) have in
effect discovered their essential force in this association between the buried knowledges of erudition
and those disqualified from the hierarchy of knowledges and science." Id.
What emerges from the "association" of these two projects of excavation is "something one might
call a genealogy... a painstaking rediscovery of struggles together with the rude memory of their
conflicts." I& at 83. What emerged at the conference and what will emerge in the discussion to
come over the right to vote and be represented in the District of Columbia is "a rediscovery" of the
struggle for black power and the memory of all those early and not so early conflicts. Foucault's
project was political: "Let us give the term genealogy to the union of erudite knowledge and local
memories which allow us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this
knowledge tactically today." Id
My genealogy was a union between "erudite knowledge" (in the form of a critique of the
formalist presentations ofJudge Markman and Professor Kurland) and the "local memories" of the
audience members regarding lynching/voting. My genealogical remarks were in opposition to the
prevailing winds of legal "science":
What [genealogy] really does is to entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous,
disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which
would filter, hierarchise and order them in some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea
of what constitutes a science and its object. Genealogies are therefore not positivistic
returns to a more careful or exact form of science. They are precisely anti-sciences.
IS
It was my intention to us this genealogical approach to highlight Professor Raskin's argument not
by vindicating "a lyrical right to ignorance of non-knowledge," but by demonstrating the negative
.effects of centralising powers which are linked to the institutions and functioning of organized
scientific discourse." See id. at 84.
194. SreJEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). In a chapter entitled "Beale and
Legal Fundamentalism," Frank took issue with "Professor Beale, one of America's most influential
legal writers from whom, at Harvard Law School, many of the leading lawyers of this country have
received valued instruction." Frank writes:
Beale you see, repudiates the notion that law consists of past decisions and predictions as
to future decisions. Why? Why does he assert that all particularjudgments, rendered or
ever hereafter to be rendered by the courts are not law? Because, he answers, such
judgements or decisions fail to correspond to the correct definition of law. Whatever the
practical effect on the person or property of the litigants-although it might mean
hanging for the defendant in a criminal action or the loss of all of his worldly goods to the
defendant in a civil suit-Beale seems to consider that the judgement of any court is too
finite, too lowly, of too little import to be worthy of the name Law. Law, by definition must
apparently have a noble aspect, a breath-taking sweep. Law must be, Beale asserts,
UNIFORM, GENERAL, CONTINUOUS, EQUAL, CERTAIN, PURE.
Id. at 53. judge Markman and Professor Kurland were, in many ways, mirroring Beale's
.conventional" approach to law. They seemed attached to a notion of "Law" that could only be
understood through orginalism, textualism and states' rights/federalism. Frank characterized such
concerns as "childish" since the law is always open to interpretation and reinterpretation: 'The
genealogy of legal myth-making may be traced as follows: Childish dread of uncertainity and
unwillingness to face legal realities produce a basic legal myth that law is completely settled and
defined. Thence springs the subsidiary myth thatjudges never make law. That myth, in turn is the
progenitor of a large brood of troublesome semi-myths." Id. at 45.
AMERICAN UNWERSrIY LAW REVIEW
Frank's Law and the Modern Mind counsels us against rules fetishism.
Frank argues against imbuing the constitutional lines that we imagine
racing through the discourse of our law books with "reality."'95 Frank
argues against forgetting everything we know about the unconscious
mind and against pretending that the lines we have drawn are really
somehow there in the text, in the original intentions of the Framers, in
the structure of federalism: The Constitution just says we can't do itl
God I am with you! But the Constitution simply forbids it. I'm sorry,
you will have to deal with this forever. What an evasion of
responsibility!
I was doing a genealogy of a certain style of constitutional discourse.
I was not asking "Is It True or False?" in some old fashioned,
metaphysical way. I am not interested in metaphysics. I am not
interested in the substance of things not seen. I did not come here with
faith in the "Founding Fathers." I am interested in looking at which
strategies have been aided or hindered by speaking this way of
constitutional jurisprudence. I do not ask "Is it True or False?" I ask
"What is the political history of this way of representing the Truth or
falsity of constitutional statements?"
By "this way," I mean that textualism, originalism, and states'
rights/federalism is the same as states' rights-that they were the entire
content-and I was shocked by this--ofJudge Markman's delivery and
Professor Kurland's delivery.
They both spoke in the language that has belonged for a long time to
the white fundamentalism that first burst on the scene as the language
of Massive Resistance to desegregation and Brown.'" Remember
"States' rights," "interposition," "nullification," all of those words about
ways in which the Constitution stood between the pro-democracy
movement and its desires for equal justice under law? I remembered
them this morning.
This morning the fatwa made me aware that one is not allowed to
speak of this history, that one is not allowed to do a genealogy or to
show that their style resembles Reagan in Philadelphia, Mississippi.
One is not allowed to mark the fact that this style resembles the white
fundamentalism that would have kept and may yet keep us in
segregation today, tomorrow, and forever.
A genealogy of textualist, originalist, and states' rights/federalism
195. See FRANK, supra note 194, at 294. Frank writes: "[R]ule-fetichism leads the brightest and
best informed minds ... to vain attempts to dichotomize the administration of justice into
authoritative law and something wayward which is not-law, called discretion or policy.... Law is the
power to judge, to decide specific controversies."
196. See generally NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE (1969); WILHOrr, supra
note 161.
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discourse reveals a history of a style of speaking about constitutional law
that has disallowed virtually every pro-democracy change that has ever
been presented." It reveals a history of a style of talking about
constitutional law that has resulted in a lot of violence.
Robert Cover, in an essay, Vwlence and the Word, argued that we always
have to remember that judicial decisions take place in the field of pain
and death.97 These decisions actually take hold of our bodies, either in
the form of segregation or in the form of the lynching. This morning's
words have a violent history.
The spectacle of a lynching in the old days and the current
Washington, D.C. spectacle of hyper-incarceration both show us what
gets done to you when you have no vote. When you cannot vote you get
lynched or you get put in prison.
So the Thirteenth Amendment comes back into focus at last. As we
see the Thirteenth Amendment's increasing mootness scripted on
black flesh with steel chains in Washington, D.C., we cannot forget that
what we are talking about is the inseparability of questions of moral evil
from questions of constitutional law.
To speak of constitutional law as though it prevented us from doing
something democratic is to speak in the language of rules fetishism,
white fundamentalism and the fatwa. It is to speak as though it is the
Constitution and not our failure of will that prevents us from getting
what we want. We can always get what we want. The Constitution is
197. Robert Cover argued:
Legal interpretation takes place in the field of pain and death. This is true in several
senses. Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion the imposition of violence upon others:
A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his
freedom, his property, his children, even his life. Interpretations in law also constitute
justifications for violence which has already occurred or which is about to occur. When
interpreters have finished their work, they frequently leave behind victims whose lives have
been tom apart by these organized, social practices of violence. Neither legal
interpretation nor the violence it occasions may be properly understood apart from one
another.
Robert Cover, wlence and the Word, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENcE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAys OF ROBERT
COVER 203, 203 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992). Disenfranchisement cannot be separated from
the violence it occasions. Disenfranchisement in the District of Columbia causes damage to the
hearts and minds of its residents that may never be undone. It causes damage because it is a form of
segregation in the eyes of virtually all of the residents of the city. The damage is seen in several
places. First, we can see it in the war of all against all that has claimed so many young lives. Second,
we can see it in the manufacture of recidivism through undemocratic enforcement of undemocratic
laws. (Residents are not allowed to elect a District Attorney, instead the presidentially-appointed
United States Attorney oversees all serious criminal prosecutions.) City residents have no voice in
the Congress whose members undemocratically imposed these undemocratically enforced laws on
them in the first place. Third, we see the violence in the way that the chaos of voting-Apartheid is
used tojustiy voting-Apartheid. The chaos of the city is a reflection of disenfranchisement, not a
reason for disenfranchisement-to say otherwise is to blame the victims for their own victimization.
This third act of violence--blaming the victims-is the most cruel of form of all. These three forms
of violence cannot be understood apart from the violence of the words of constitutional
interpretation that serve to thwart democracy.
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what we choose to make it.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Judge Markman, I think you
wanted to make a comment earlier. I don't know if it is still valid now.
JUDGE MARKMAN: Well, the comments that I intended to make
earlier are not the comments that I would make now. Professor Butler,
it seems to me, has tried to defend Professor Farley against the
allegation from Professor Kurland that he has made various criticisms
of racial animus toward myself and Professor Kurland. Professor Farley,
however, has rejected Professor Butler's defense, it seems to me.
I guess I would just say briefly that proponents are free to
characterize opposing arguments as they choose, and it is common in
this kind of debate to raise the racial issue. I have been involved in this
debate before, and I am sure most of my colleagues have. It is not
uncommon to impute racial motives in the context of this kind of
debate.
Professor Farley and Professor Kairys, I think, have done this. They
have caricatured concerns about federalism as a mere camouflage for
racism. They have caricatured concerns about originalism and
textualism as mere code words for racial animus. Professor Kairys says
there is no serious argument that "State" means "State," and therefore
the arguments raised by Professor Kurland and myself are not serious,
and perhaps motivated by inappropriate impulses.
I would ask you, ladies and gentlemen, are these the arguments that
you really wish to embrace in support of the constitutional argument
that some form of representation for the District of Columbia is
compelled? Do you think that your cause is strengthened by these
kinds of arguments? Do you think they are effective with those who
may have somewhat different perspectives? Do you think, for example,
that Rick Valentine's boss is going to respond favorably to these kinds of
arguments?
It may stir the blood of some of the people in the audience, and it
may excite some of their passions. But I would respectfilly say that
these arguments are way off base. They are inaccurate.
Whether you agree with the constitutional arguments raised by
Professor Kurland and myself, whether you agree with our
jurisprudence or not, they are certainly within the mainstream of this
debate, perhaps not in every neighborhood of academia, but certainly
among those on Capitol Hill and among the people as a whole.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): We'll go to Mr. Cox. He
wanted to say something about this.
MR. COX: I really don't want to belabor the point. But I think that
there is a constitutional argument to be made.
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Hypothetically, if you have a jurisdiction, such as the District of
Columbia, in which you can prove under the standard established by
the Supreme Court in Rogers v. Lodge ' s and Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,'9 that the electoral system has
been maintained, and is being maintained for racial reasons, there
could be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause to the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The way you could analyze such a case would be to look at, among
other things, the history of and the process of maintaining the system;
whether the people who comprise the protected class involved have any
power in controlling the maintenance of that system; and the impact of
the system on the electorate.
This would help prove a constitutional case for racial discrimination
and racial intent. That is what I would add to the discussion, without, of
course, impugning anyone's motivations or sincerity on this issue.
In addition, one could argue that in a city that has a large
African-American/minority population, the maintenance of a system
that operates to exclude completely the electorate from equal
representation in Congress offers no better indicator of exclusion from
the political process. This is what Justice O'Connor has called the
"inexorable zero," and most strongly justifies corrective action. 0
Again, I think one can make these arguments validly and
dispassionately. These are the types of arguments made in traditional
198. 458 US. 613 (1982).
199. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
200. Proof of discriminatory intent in the adoption or maintenance of an election system may
be made either by direct or circumstantial evidence, see Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982);
Buskey v. Oliver, 565 F. Supp. 1473, 1481 (M.D. Ala. 1983); S. REP. No. 97-417, at 27 n.108 (1982),
and in many circumstances may be "inferred from the totality of relevant facts," see Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). To establish sufficient evidence of purposeful discrimination requiring
strictjudicial scrutiny, it need not be shown that race was the sole motivation, or even the primary
reason behind the challenged action, but only that it was a motivating factor. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at
618; Village of Aslington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66. The assessment of whether purposeful
discrimination was a motivating consideration "demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent as may be available." See id. at 266; see also Rogers, 458 US. at 618. The
Supreme Court has stated that assessing the impact of the official action, whether "the law bears
more heavily on one race than another," provides "an important starting point" to this inquiry. See
Arlington Heights, 429 US. at 266 (quoting Washington, 426 U.S. at 242); see also Rogers, 458 U.S. at
623-27. In addition, the Supreme Court has identified several factors that may provide evidence of
the discriminatory motivation, including (1) the historical background of the decision; (2) the
sequence of events leading up to the action taken; (3) procedural departures from the normal
process; (4) substantive departures from the normal process; and (5) the legislative or
administrative history, including contemporary statements by the members of the governing body,
minutes of their meetings, and any testimony by the decision makers regarding their intent. See
Arfington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267-68.
201. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 US. 616, 656-57 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (quoting International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342
n.23 (1977)).
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voting rights cases.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Thank you. I want to give
one more chance for people on the panel to make some statements
before we open it up to questions. I want to open up the questions by
about four o'clock. It will give us about fifteen minutes for questions.
Mr. Valentine, why don't you start.
MR. VALENTINE: In response to something that Professor Butler
said earlier, I am certainly willing to concede that there may be people
out there who oppose D.C. voting rights because they are racist. But I
see no element of that whatsoever in Steve Markman's position. I have
known Steve since 1983. I have never heard him make a racist remark,
implicitly or explicitly. He is totally free of racism. He treats everyone
fairly.
I don't know Professor Kurland, but I don't see any element of
racism in what he is saying. I can certainly tell you there isn't any
motivating me. But I understand the concern, and there are people
out there, I would think, who are motivated by that.
I think it is legitimate to make that point, that there may be such
people. But their racism shouldn't taint the rest of us who are making
good faith, sincere arguments about the way we think the Constitution
works.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Professor Neuman, and then
Professor Kairys.
PROFESSOR NEUMAN: Yes. I just wanted to make two comments.
First, this is a law school, and I am an academic.
I want to say that, as an academic, I perhaps understood Professor
Farley's comments differently than some other members of the
audience may have understood them, as not being engaged in a
discussion of the personal motives of individuals but as an analysis of
discourse, which sought to express a perspective on a discourse. In
academia, for good or ill, we hear this kind of analysis, and we don't
conclude necessarily that particular individuals' motives are being
brought to light.
I want to make another academic comment, which is also a legal
argument, but a legal argument that is not likely to be politically
popular in the broader world. But again, since this is a law school, I
thought I would just make this academic legal argument, which is to
bring in the international human rights perspective.
I am not ready to draw a firm conclusion. But I think a good
argument can be made that in fact the current disenfranchisement of
residents of the District violates the United States's obligations under
Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
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an international treaty that perhaps very few people in the room have
ever heard of, but to which the United States became a party in 1992.202
Article 25 of the Covenant guarantees to all citizens the right to
political participation. It says among other things that every citizen
shall have the right without unreasonable restrictions to take part in the
conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives, to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage guaranteeing the free
expression of the will of the electors.
For the reasons that I stated earlier, I think the disenfranchisement of
the District is so anachronistic that it could not be regarded as a
reasonable restriction on the right to vote, although I recognize there is
room for argument, both in terms of what is meant by a reasonable
restriction, and whether there are reasonable arguments for
disenfranchising the District.
Now if the citizens of the District cannot constitutionally be given the
right to vote this treaty is not particularly relevant because the United
States, in ratifying the treaty, did not take on an obligation to violate its
Constitution. But as I said earlier, I think there are statutory solutions
to this problem.
I affirm the legality of two of those statutory solutions, the statehood
and retrocession arguments. I am more open minded but not yet
persuaded by the argument for enfranchising the citizens of the District
by statute while maintaining the District of Columbia as seat of
government. But those are statutory ways by which, without violating
the Constitution, in my view-I realize others may disagree-Congress
could comply with this obligation.
That leads me to the conclusion that there is a good argument to be
made, subject to further analysis, that in fact the United States is also in
violation of its human rights obligations under that treaty by not finding
a solution to the disenfranchisement of the District. Amending the
Constitution, although not required, would be an additional and
perhaps superior way of solving the problem.
Now I realize that holding the United States to its international
human rights obligations is not always a politically popular platform. I
also realize that those obligations are notjudicially enforceable. So I
am not suggesting count twenty-six for the lawsuit. But again, since this
is a law school, I thought that was an additional academic perspective
that should be brought to bear on the problem.
202. &eInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19,1966, art. 25,999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter International Covenant].
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Thank you.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Professor Kairys.
PROFESSOR KAIRYS: I took Professor Farley's comments as
Professor Neuman described them. When I made my comments, I
specifically said-Judge Markman, I'm rather surprised to hear you miss
this-that I was not speaking about the two of you.
What you have done, I think, is to make it very difficult to talk about
race in much the way Professor Butler pointed out, which is rather
characteristic of this period; and in my case also to talk about where the
opposition comes from, because the constitutional arguments of the
opposition are not very strong.
To focus solely on the interpretation of the word "State" and not to
pay attention to the moral or social or political problem does raise a fair
question.
I said I am putting you two aside, and I want to explore where the
opposition comes from because the interpretation argument seems like
a toss up at best. It doesn't seem nearly as clear as you said. So where is
the opposition, I said, in general?
What you have done is to make a discussion of the realities of this
issue seem like an ad hominem attack.
JUDGE MARKMAN: Perhaps. But you have suggested that
discussions of federalism and originalism and textualism are essentially
nothing other than racism in a different guise. At Temple University,
don't you have a Center for the Study of Federalism? Don't you have a
very distinguished journal on federalism? Aren't you at Temple Law
School?
PROFESSOR KAIRYS: Yes.
JUDGE MARKMAN: Yes. You have a very well-respected center for
the study of federalism there. Do you describe all of their work as
"States' rights?"
PROFESSOR KAIRYS: I said states' rights has been a barrier to every
advance of equality, and it has to be weighed. Your resting just on
states' rights or federalism as if it is a consistent absolute and nothing
else matters would lead, for instance, to no Brown v. Board ofEducation.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Very briefly. Professor
Kurland,just one very brief response, and then get on. I don't want the
rest of this to become a discussion of this issue. So a very brief response,
and then we are going to go to some opening questions.
PROFESSOR KURLAND: Very brief. I guess I object to even the
concept that there is a states' rights issue poking around here. I mean,
the bottom line is-I mean, states' rights is a code word for a lot of
things, a lot of things with regard to the barriers for the advancement of
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civil rights from the '30s, the '40s, the '50s, the '60s, and so on.
But with regard to the term, "State," that we are talking about here,
this is not states' rights in any way, shape, or form even connected to
that because this goes back to the very foundation of federalism that,
like it or not, it took the colonies, the states, nine of them to ratify the
Constitution, that the make-up of the federal legislature is the states in
the Senate and representatives of the people of the several states in the
House.
Despite the moral claim for one man, one vote, or one person, one
vote to get direct election of senators and other moral claims, it took a
constitutional amendment.
Again, so I think that some of the problems here are thinking that
this is even a strain of a states' rights argument as the term is
understood with regard to the actions in the '30s, '40s, '50s, and '60s,
and I just disagree with that. I don't think that it is 203
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): I want to move on now to
questions from the audience. These questions can go to either the
people on the debate or the people on the panel. Anyone who wants to
ask a question can come up to the microphone here, or we hopefully
will have a microphone on the other side also.
MR. PLOTKIN: My name is Mark Plotkin. I was not at the panel
discussion this morning, nor was I at Judge Markman and your
presentations, so I plead ignorance of what you have said. But I do
remember what you said during the statehood debate, and I remember
203. "Philadelphia, Mississippi" is an unmistakable reference to the notorious murders of three
civil rights workers in 1964. Fora general discussion of the murders during the "Freedom Summer"
of 1964, see TAYLOR BRANCH, P.LAR OF FIREZ AMERCA IN THE KING YEARS 1963-65, at 341-510
(1998). "Philadelphia, Mississippi" symbolizes the most violent strain of "States Rights,"-Southern
State claims of interposition and often violent opposition to federal efforts to guarantee federal
constitutional rights. See generally MELVIN UROFSKY, A MARCH OF LIBERTY 775-76 (1998) (discussing
several southern state legislatures' actions in response to Brown v. Board of Education, including
adoption of resolutions protesting the illegal encroachment of the federal government).
The Federalism argument that I have asserted here, that the District of Columbia is not a state for
the constitutional purposes of being entitled to representation in the national legislature, has
nothing to do with the southern states' unlawful and often violent resistance to federal authority.
Rather, my arguments concern two other distinct aspects of Federalism that were the subject of
considerable debate at the Constitutional Convention-the make-up of the federal legislature, see
MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CoNSTTION OF THE UNITED STATES 91-112 (1913)
(discussing the Great Compromise which allowed the work of the Convention to continue), and the
creation of the Seat of Government of the United States, a unique constitutional entity that was not
a state. See i. at 48, 179.
To be sure, all of these issues concern "Federalism," in that they all concern different aspects of
the allocation of authority between the States and the national government. However, Federalism
represents an enormous constitutional vessel. As noted above, the issues involved in this debate at
the Washington College of Law are so fundamentally distinct that simplistic attempts to equate the
most violent strain of States' Rights with these other constitutional issues, even when such attempts
are camouflaged under the guise of "Foucaultian genealogy," reveal an air of demagogic
desperation devoid of any meaningful constitutional analysis.
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what Mr. Valentine said.
I have a comment, and then I have a question of Peter Raven-
Hansen. The comments where everybody gets personal about this have
to do with a tenor that is set-and I don't celebrate this remark-I
annunciate this remark wherever I go because I think it didn't get the
massive distribution and circulation it richly deserved.
On WAMU in 1995, I asked the Speaker of the House, who happens
to be a Republican, Newt Gingrich, whether he felt it was an
unfortunate choice of words, prophetically or non-prophetically-I said
the denial of voting representation-not statehood-the denial of
voting representation to the citizens of the District of Columbia, is that
not a stain on democracy. I wish I had used a different word, but stain.
But I remember distinctly what the Speaker of the House said, so that
you two gentlemen can understand the remarks of this gentleman,
because I am not registering you as Republicans if you are not.
I know one is a Republican. Two are Republicans, three. The
Speaker of the House-he never met me before, but he was trying to be
friendly.
"Mark, first", he said, "you should be happy you have a radio show"-
which was a paternalistic sort of, well, what is your beef. "You have got a
radio show." Why are -you even asking me this question? Then here is
the clincher.
PROFESSOR RASKIN: You are lucky the citizens don't get to vote on
that, Mark. [Laughter]
MR. PLOTKIN: You hurt my punch line, and it is very serious. His
remark was, 'You should be happy, you have more rights than anyone
in Cuba." That was the Speaker of the House's response to a very
serious question. We are laughing, and it provides good anecdotal
storytelling for me to do, but it is a sickening remark. It is a devastating
remark.
It was only printed in The New York Times Magazine when they had
Barry and Gingrich on the front cover. But that in some ways, if you
want to understand the sensitivity of why these gentlemen say direct
remarks, because that is kind of the feeling, the overlay of that.
Second, I wanted to ask Mr. Valentine-I saw your presentation on
statehood. Would your senator that you presently work for [Senator
Bob Smith] vote for congressional representation if it had to go
through the constitutional amendment process?
To me, that is really the next question because Joe Robb, the
legendary D.C. Voting advocate, said, look they voted for that in '78
knowing that the state legislatures would defeat it. So the real test is
would Senator Smith vote for it if it was being sent out as a
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constitutional amendment.
Could you just answer that yes or no?
MR. VALENTINE: I wish I could, but I would probably get fired if I
did. I can't speak for the Senator because we have never discussed it.
MR. PLOTKIN: But can you understand my argument
MR. VALENTINE: Sure.
MR. PLOTKIN: I didn't hear Judge Markman's presentation. I
would like somebody to defend, not the process by which we get it, but
by which it is denied us, not by method. Just defend that we should not
have the vote. Is there anybody in this room who can do that?
I didn't hear your-are you defending that, that we do not deserve a
vote? Is that the Armstrong Williams school of-you moved here
knowing full well that you were not allowed to be represented, and you
have the freedom of travel to go somewhere where you do have the
vote.
I didn't hear your presentation. Is that your thesis?
JUDGE MAR1MAN: No, it wasn't.
MR. PLOTKIN: It wasn't? Are you for voting representation, but by
constitutional amendment? I didn't hear your presentation.
JUDGE MARKMAN: I have no objection to the idea of citizens of the
District of Columbia having a vote through some constitutional
mechanism. Indeed, I think it is a positive thing that we try to devise
that mechanism.
I simply think that the mechanism must be some kind of statehood or
retrocession enactment because I think that federalism implications-
serious federalism implications, in my mind-are raised when you give
citizens of a non-state representation in the legislature.
MR. PLOTKIN: I am almost finished. Professor Neuman, it bothers
me, it is repugnant to me, to think that voting-you don't think it-on
the hierarchy of injustices, its such a big deal. I think it is the most basic
and central thing-I am not a lawyer-but to a democracy. In Chicago,
where I am from, it is so important, we vote more than once.
But I want you to answer that. Then the final point is to Professor
Raven-Hansen. Mr. Gibson was sitting here in this room at one time.
He has now backed away from it. He said, "look, let's not push so hard
for the vote in the Senate. Let's just be satisfied with a vote in the
House."
I don't believe in partial democracy. Would you please justify the
vote in both houses, and second, why the amendment is constitutional.
The greatest fear I have with Jamie-we have talked a long time about
this-is that the court will say, "you are absolutely right. But you have a
remedy, and the remedy is the constitutional amendment."
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PROFESSOR RAVEN-HANSEN: Mark, I didn't know you had a radio
show [laughter]. The problem as between the House and the Senate is
simply textual, that Article I, Section 2, speaks of the "People of the
several States" in describing the composition of the House.2 4  Of
course, the original provisions of the Constitution with respect to the
Senate spoke to "Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature
thereof...
MR. PLOTKIN: [inaudible]
PROFESSOR RAVEN-HANSEN: Correct. So you may have an easier
argument if you are argung that it is the people, "We the People," who
are represented for House representation than you have for Senate
representation.
In addition, you will encounter the argument that Judge Markman
made about equal representation in the Senate. I think the answer is
that the states do have representation equal to one another, but many
people see that as a dilution argument, and that also is textually based.
So the Senate presents some difficulties that the House doesn't
present. I wasn't urging a half of a loaf in that regard. I only pointed
put that the legal arguments are slightly different.
MR- PLOTKIN: [Inaudible]
PROFESSOR RAVEN-HANSEN: Well, they might well. I mean, one
of the problems is this lawsuit draws short of describing the remedy, so
it potentially leaves that alternative.
That is one of the reasons I am pessimistic about the success of the
lawsuit in strictly remedy terms is that the courts might well pass the
buck and say, "let's hear from Congress." One of the things Congress
can do is to start a constitutional amendment going.
MR PLOTKIN: [Inaudible]
PROFESSOR RAVEN-HANSEN: Well, I don't know. Maybe there is
some hope that a creative judge can help in that regard. The lawsuit,
you know, speaks to the strongest part of a legal theory that it is
advancing and does not complete the sentence because the remedy
part is hard. One hope is maybe that Congress somewhere along the
way will pay attention.
One possibility here, you realize, is what I would call a "hand-
wringing decision" from the judge, in which the judge says, "a
tremendous wrong has been committed here. We have a constitutional
anomaly. This is a disgrace to the system. It is contrary to a long line of
recent voting rights cases. But my hands are tied."
204. U.S. CONSr. ar. I, § 2, d. 1.
205. Id. § 3, cd. 1 (repealed 1913).
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That would not be the worst possible outcome. We would be better
off, or the District would be better off, with that outcome than with no
lawsuit at all, it seems to me, because then you have a jurist agreeing
with two-thirds of the legal theories. The hope is at that point that
some principled members of Congress might withdraw their legal
objections and go about taking corrective action.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Professor Neuman, did you
want to respond to what Mr. Plotkin said?
PROFESSOR NEUMAN: Yes, very briefly. It may be that
philosophically all injustices are equal and it is wrong to try to think of
injustices as having degrees. But if injustices do have degrees, then I
think that we should not lose sight of how enormous the atrocity of the
Dred Scott decision was, holding that black people could not be citizens
of the United States.2'
I have called the disenfranchisement of the District an injustice, an
anomaly, a disgrace, morally illegitimate, and a violation of
international human rights.
But at the same time, being someone who does draw these
distinctions of degree among injustices, I don't believe it rises to quite
the level of the Dred Scott decision. That doesn't mean we shouldn't do
something about it, but I just think it is important for those who do
draw such distinctions to remember which is which.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Next question.
AUDIENCE MEMBER- I have three points. First, international
law-I understand a covenant which is passed as a treaty is the law of
the land under the Constitution. Since Chief Justice Marshall,
international law has been justiciable by the courts. I am not sure of the
status of the treaty of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, though.
27
Second, this is a lawsuit, notjust an academic discussion. I heard Mr.
Valentine say that he thought that the Justice Department would
defend the case. I don't know if anyone is sure whether that would
happen or not.
If the Justice Department did not defend the case, took a default
judgment or admitted the allegations of the suit, what would the
Congress do? Because after all, it is their discretion as the executive
branch, I would assume, unless directed by Congress otherwise.
Third, the Twenty-third Amendment to the Constitution spoke of the
rights of D.C. as if it were a state. Would that negate some of the earlier
206. &e Scott v. Sandford, 60 US. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
207. SeeInternational Covenant, supra note 202.
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historical arguments that go back to the other earlier parts of the
Constitution and basically negate them? May it have in fact taken rights
other than those rights to vote for president away from the residents of
D.C.?
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Why don't we deal with these
separately? Professor Neuman, do you want to address the
international law question?
PROFESSOR NEUMAN: Yes. Treaties are the law of the land. But
since Chief Justice Marshall, there has been a distinction between self-
executing treaties and non-self-executing treaties. Self-executing
treaties are enforceable in the courts without implementing legislation.
Non-self-executing treaties are not."s
The Senate, when it gave its consent to ratification, attached a
declaration that the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was not a
self-executing treaty.m Although one could spin out legal arguments as
to why that declaration should be ignored, the courts have held that the
Covenant is not self-executing in other cases, including a case brought
by residents of Puerto Rico claiming that under the Covenant they
should have voting rights in presidential elections.10
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): The second part about the
representation of the Justice Department-Mr. Valentine, do you want
to say something?
MR. VALENTINE: Yes. As I said, I assume that the Clinton Justice
Department will defend against this lawsuit. But if they were to decline
to do it, the way that is handled is that the Justice Department would
notify Congress that they are declining to defend the lawsuit. Then it
would be up to Congress to decide whether to have its own legal
counsel do so. If that happened, I assume that Congress would defend
against the lawsuit.
PROFESSOR RASKIN: Could I make one quick point here? There is
an executive branch defendant as well who is the Secretary of
Commerce, Mr. Daley.
Every ten years, after the census, the Secretary of Commerce prepares
a reapportionment report which goes out over the signature of the
President to Congress notifying Congress of where the people are
208. SeRESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFFOREIGNREATIONS§ Il (1987).
209. See 138 CONG. REC. S4781, S4784 (1992) ("The United States declares that the provisions
of Articles 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing.").
210. See Igaruta de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994) (declaring that the failure
of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act to guarantee citizens moving to
Puerto Rico the right to vote in presidential elections did not violate their due process and equal
protection rights), art. denieA 514 U.S. 1049 (1995). The Court also ruled that Puerto Rican
residents have no right under Article II of the Constitution to vote in presidential elections. Se id.
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living. District residents have been excluded from that for basically the
last two centuries.
So the first relief we are seeking is an order that the Secretary of
Commerce count and include the District population for the purposes
of reapportionment. So there is an executive branch official. I think
that one plausible outcome is that the defendant concedes judgment
on that point and agrees to correct the apportionment report.
You are correct that it would go on to the legislative branch officials.
MR. VALENTINE: I don't think that they will default on that point.
You could be right, but I don't think so.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Next question.
MR. STRAUSS: Thank you. I am Paul Strauss. I feel a little strange
here because I am the elected United States Senator from the District
of Columbia.
I guess in a practical sense, I actually don't exist for the purposes of
this discussion, a position sometimes called the shadow senator, which
remains, I guess, the last public effort by the citizens of the District to
begin to remedy their lack of enfranchisement
Two specific questions. One, people talked about the distinction
between remedies, perhaps empowering the individual but
disempowering the collective, and to what extent might that be a real
risk.
For example, if the result of all of this is that the District actually gets
its rights along with other federal enclaves, have we really moved
forward.
If the remedy is more in the nature of overseas voting, for example,
rather than being able to represent my constituents in the Senate, as I
was elected and eventually hope to do, my remedy is to return voting
absentee in NewYork state elections. Have we in fact moved forward? I
guess Professor Raven-Hansen spoke a little bit about that
I guess a specific question to the scholars is on the Twenty-third
Amendment, made perhaps a little bit more timely.
If, at least for the purpose of presidential section, the District under
the Twenty-third Amendment is treated as if it was a state, does that
provide any basis, given at least the less than remote specter of potential
impeachment proceedings in the Senate-does it provide anything
other than another good moral argument'
Is there any legal basis to suggest that the Twenty-third Amendment
may be some independent basis on at least the question of presidential
impeachment before empowering representation by the District and
the Senate?
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): On the remedies question,
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Jamie, why don't you address-because Professor Raven-Hansen also
suggested the emptiness of the remedies thing in the suit. Why don't
you suggest the problems that might be created by one remedy versus
another?
PROFESSOR RASKIN: The complaint filed by the Corporation
Counsel and Covington is vague in the first instance about the remedy
on the theory that any federal judge declaring that there are
constitutional injuries taking place in the District would give Congress
the opportunity, because it is a political decision how to remedy the
voting rights.
It is similar to the one person, one vote cases or the recent line of
majority/minority district cases where the court says, this is
unconstitutional, but we are going to let the political branches deal with
it.
So the court would give Congress in the first instance the chance to
decide what the remedy would be, which is the importance of the
parallel political effort. There is a movement in place working with
Eleanor Holmes Norton and Paul Strauss to push the remedy that the
people want.
NowJohn Ferren as the lawyer for the District, I think, is in the best
position to articulate what that remedy is.
But my sense is that the remedy that is going to be propounded
foremost by the legal counsel for the plaintiffs in this case is direct
representation as though it were a state, just as the District operates for
presidential elections as though it were state, just as Congress treats it as
though it were a state for 500 other purposes. Just as Congress
admitted as states the Commonwealth of Virginia or the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, it can treat as a state the District of Columbia.
It is the cleanest, most logical, and most elegant solution. We have
pointed out that there are other kinds of things that could be done to
show, as Professor Netman points out, that there are other statutory
solutions short of retrocession, short of statehood.
There is most prominently the Maryland-based option, which is a
possibility, but I think creates more problems than direct
representation does.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Professor Raven-Hansen, do
you want to say something else?
PROFESSOR RAVEN-HANSEN: Yes. The last two speakers both had
questions about the Twenty-third Amendment. The Twenty-third
Amendment gives the District the number of electors "to which [it]
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would be entitled if it were a State,"211 and that language is actually in
there.
That cuts both ways, as lawyers are fond of saying. It may simply be
an illustration of the principle that I was arguing for, that sometimes
when the word "State" is used in the Corlstitution, the District should be
considered a state for that purpose.
Or it may illustrate that where voting rights are concerned, you
actually need an amendment that says the District is a state in order to
accomplish the voting right. I am sure that opponents of D.C. voting
rights will take that line, and proponents will take the first line. I don't
know how it will come out.
PROFESSOR KURLAND: Well, can I just-as someone who has
written on the Twenty-third Amendment, just to amplify on that. The
Twenty-third Amendment was necessary to give the District
representation in the electoral college.
Had it not been ratified, or had it not been proposed, one would
have made the arguments that we are making here that the District
doesn't need the Twenty-third Amendment to vote for President
because if it is already a state under these other provisions, it is entitled
to electoral representation.
So I think it rather clearly cuts in favor of the fact that the District
needed a constitutional amendment to give its citizens voting rights in
the electoral college. You would also need a constitutional amendment
to give the District citizens the right to vote for Congress and the
Senate.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Very briefly.
PROFESSOR RASKIN: Just a quick answer to that. I think that
Adam's [Professor Kurland] point is absolutely wrong because the
people are represented directly by the members of Congress. But when
you elect a President, he is elected through the selection of electors, by
way of the electoral college, which is why the Twenty-third Amendment
was needed: to provide for the organization of the electoral college in
the District.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Okay. I would like to thank
all the participants for their thoughtful responses to a timely and vexing
question.
(Whereupon, the PROCEEDINGS were concluded.)
211. US. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1, d. 1.
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